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ABSTRACT.  Many traditional conjoint representations are based on additive 21 
decomposability.  An important generalization arises under rank-dependence, when 22 
such representations are restricted to cones with a fixed ranking of components from 23 
best to worst, leading to configural weighting, rank-dependent utility, and rank- and 24 
sign-dependent prospect theory.  A new paradigm for representations was developed 25 
by Duncan Luce and others, allowing for basic rationality violations regarding the 26 
coalescing of events and other framing assumptions.  In recent papers, Luce’s 27 
approach called for a new, rank-additive, version of rank-dependent representations, 28 
where additive representations on different cones should be combined into one overall 29 
representation.  This paper provides a preference foundation of rank-dependent 30 
additive utility.  Thus, a complete preference foundation can be obtained of the recent 31 
models by Luce and others. 32 
 33 
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1. Introduction 35 
 Duncan Luce developed, jointly with several co-authors, an innovative paradigm 36 
for decision under uncertainty.  Luce (2000) presented a complete description of this 37 
paradigm, with a short accessible account in Luce (1990).  His paradigm deviates 38 
from the commonly used Savagean (1954) paradigm in several respects, and provides 39 
sophisticated models that can account for basic violations of rationality.  The 40 
importance of modeling such violations has become increasingly understood during 41 
the last 20 years.  Several recent papers by Luce et al. on preference foundations take 42 
a so-called rank-additive utility (RAU) model as point of departure (Luce &  Marley 43 
2005; Marley & Luce 2005; Marley, Luce, & Kocsis 2007).  We refer to Luce et al. to 44 
designate this line of research.  Their models also underly the RAM and TAX models 45 
developed by Birnbaum and his colleagues (Birnbaum 2007 and the references 46 
therein). 47 
 The preference foundation of the RAU model has as yet remained an open 48 
problem (Luce & Marley 2005, Section 2.1).  Thus, the models of Luce et al. have not 49 
yet received complete preference foundations.  This paper provides a preference 50 
foundation of RAU and, thereby, completes the preference foundation of the models 51 
by Luce et al. 52 
 53 
2. Assumptions 54 
 C denotes a set of outcomes, and í a binary relation on C.  Π denotes a set of 55 
partitions.  In works by Luce et al., a partition π is an ordered set (an array) of 56 
mutually exclusive events, where events can be logical statements or subsets of a 57 
universal event.  The events need not be exhaustive, with the union of π’s elements a 58 
nonuniversal event upon which decisions are conditioned.  A partition is also called 59 
an experiment.  In this paper, a partition can be any ordered index set containing 60 
finitely many, 2 or more, elements.  For each π, n(π) ≥ 2 denotes its number of 61 
elements.  X contains C and all rank-ordered tuples of the form x = (π,x1,…,xn(π)) 62 
with x1 í ... í xn(π).  We call x π-related.  We will later give results for the case where 63 
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this rank-ordering requirement is dropped, and X contains C and all tuples of the form 64 
x = (π,x1,…,xn(π)). 65 
 In Luce et al.’s approach, (π,x1,…,xn(π)) designates a gamble yielding outcome xj 66 
if the jth event of π is true.  Formally, (π,x1,…,xn(π)) is not a function from the partition 67 
to X as in the classical Savagean approach (1954), but it is treated as a general n(π)+1 68 
tuple.  Thus, Luce et al. allow for basic violations of rationality.  For instance, for 69 
disjoint events A,B,C, ((A∪B,C), $100, $0) can be treated differently than ((A,B,C), 70 
$100, $100, $0).  In this manner, violations of “coalescing” can be considered.  In the 71 
Savagean approach, with events subsets of a set called state space, both objects are 72 
defined to be functions from A∪B∪C, assigning value $100 to all elements of A and 73 
B, and $0 to all elements of C.  Then the two objects are identical by definition and 74 
there is no possibility to distinguish between them.  For empirical studies of violations 75 
of coalescing, the generality of Luce et al.’s model is needed.  To allow for the 76 
generality of Luce et al.’s approach, this paper treats partitions as general objects 77 
without restrictions imposed on them.  Many interpretations are possible.  Partitions 78 
could designate ordered sets of persons (or time points), with (π,x1,…,xn(π)) 79 
designating allocations of money over these persons (or consumption on these time 80 
points) and with the implicit assumption that all persons not listed in π receive 81 
nothing (or no consumption on other time points).  Partitions could be ordered sets of 82 
properties of persons such as kindness, honesty, age, and the x-s could designate 83 
scores regarding these properties. 84 
 We assume that í on C is extended to the whole set X and, for simplicity, denote 85 
the extension also by í.  The notation ê, Ç, Ä, and ~ is as usual.  We assume that 86 
strong monotonicity holds, implying that (π,x1,…,xn(π)) ê  (π,y1,…,yn(π)) whenever xj 87 
í yj for all j and xj ê yj for at least one j.  In Luce et al.’s approach, strong 88 
monotonicity implies that null events are suppressed. 89 
 We assume that for each x∈X there exists a certainty equivalent α ∈ C, defined 90 
by α ~ x.  Idempotence, requiring that (π,α,…,α) ~ α, is a natural assumption in some 91 
applications but Luce et al. also considered generalizations and, therefore, we do not 92 
assume it here.  For example, if partitions contain mutually exclusive but not 93 
necessarily exhaustive events as in Luce’s approach, and (π,x1,…,xn(π)) designates a 94 
gamble conditional on the information that the event occurring is an element of the 95 
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partition π, then idempotence is a natural condition.  If, however, (π,x1,…,xn(π)) 96 
designates a gamble with the implicit assumption that the outcome received is 0 for all 97 
events not contained in π, then idempotence is not a natural assumption.  98 
  To avoid cases of degeneracy, large cardinality of the equivalence classes in C, 99 
and cases where different π’s have no overlapping indifference classes so that they are 100 
unrelated, we assume that there exists an outcome α0 such that for each π there is a π-101 
related x, nonmaximal in the π-related n-tuples, with x ~ α0.1  In the papers by Luce et 102 
al., α0 can be what is called the neutral outcome. 103 
 We further assume that there exists a function U: X → — that represents í, i.e. í 104 
maximizes U.  Hence, í is a weak order, meaning that it is complete (x í y or y í x 105 
for all x,y ∈ X) and transitive.  We assume that for each fixed π there exist functions 106 
V1(π,.), …, Vn(π)(π,.) from C to —, and a function Vπ on the π-related x such that  107 
 x = (π,x1,…,xn(π)) # V1(π,x1) + ... + Vn(π)(π,xn(π)) = Vπ(x) (2.1) 108 
represents í when restricted to the π-related x.  Thus, there exist strictly increasing 109 
functions Lπ such that 110 
 U(x) = Lπ(Vπ(x))  (2.2) 111 
on the relevant domain.  For each outcome α ∈ C and partition π for which there 112 
exists a π-related x such that α ~ x, we write Vπ(α) = Vπ(x).  Thus, we have extended 113 
the domain of Vπ to a part of C.  Eq. 2.2 continues to hold for this extension of Vπ. 114 
 By strong monotonicity, every function Vj is strictly increasing in í in the usual 115 
sense.  We further assume that the range of each function defined so far in this paper 116 
is a nondegenerate interval.  It implies that all functions Lπ have no “jumps” so that 117 
they must be continuous.  We then also have connected preference topologies, and for 118 
each π preference is continuous w.r.t. the product topology on the π-related tuples.   119 
 In the preference foundation of rank-additive utility provided below, we will 120 
assume all conditions of this section.  To obtain a complete preference foundation, a 121 
preference foundation of the assumptions of this section should be provided.  The 122 
                                                 
1 This condition is satisfied under idempotence plus nontriviality (at least two nonindifferent objects).   
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existence of U with an interval as image is characterized by separability and 123 
connectedness of the order topology (Debreu 1964), a condition that in view of the 124 
existence of certainty equivalents needs to be imposed only on C.  For Eq. 2.1 and the 125 
assumptions about the functions therein, a preference foundation is in Wakker (1993), 126 
with generalizations in Chateauneuf & Wakker (1993).  For brevity, we will not 127 
repeat them here, but refer the reader to those works.   128 
 It is easy to see that in Eq. 2.2 we can choose any real constants τ1, …, τn(π), and 129 
any positive σ > 0, and then replace every Vj(π,.) by τj+σVj(π,.).  It can also be 130 
proved that this is the only freedom we have for this representation, so that the 131 
functions Vj(π,.) are unique up to level and joint scale (Wakker 1993).  The functions 132 
V1(π,.), …, Vn(π)(π,.) are joint interval scales.  The function Vπ(x) is an interval scale, 133 
being unique up to the level τ = τ1 + ... + τn(π) and the scale σ. 134 
 135 
3. Rank-Additive Utility 136 
 We are interested in the special case of Eq. 2.2 where the ordinal transformations 137 
Lπ can be dropped. 138 
 139 
DEFINITION 3.1. Rank-additive utility (RAU) holds if all functions Lπ are the identity, 140 
so that we have 141 
 U(x) = V1(π,x1) + ... + Vn(π)(π,xn(π)) = Vπ(x). (3.1) 142 
· 143 
 144 
We provide a preference foundation of RAU.  It will imply that all functions Vπ 145 
coincide on common subdomains of C.   146 
 Our preference foundation will be based on a variation of the tradeoff technique 147 
of Köbberling & Wakker (2003, 2004).  A natural way to obtain a preference 148 
foundation for a decision model arises from considering ways to elicit the subjective 149 
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quantities used in the model2 from preferences in a parameter-free deterministic 150 
model, and then excluding inconsistencies in such measurements.  We will next 151 
explain how U in Eq. 3.1 can be elicited from preferences. 152 
 For x = (π,x1,…,xn(π)), i ≤ n(π), and μ ∈ C, μix denotes (π,x1,…,xn(π)) with xi 153 
replaced by μ.  It is implicit in this notation that the replacement respects rank-154 
ordering, so that xi−1 í μ í xi+1.  U on C can be elicited from observations of the 155 
following kind: 156 
 α ~ μix,  γ ~ μiy,  157 
 β ~ νix, δ ~ νiy. (3.2) 158 
We write αβ ~* γδ if there exists a partition π, π-related x and y, outcomes μ and ν, 159 
and an index i such that Eq. 3.2 holds.  In this notation we deliberately “forget” the 160 
partition π.  The main point of the following discussion in fact amounts to 161 
establishing that this notation is useful.  The following lemma shows how ~* 162 
observations serve to measure Vπ  and, hence, U on C if RAU holds. 163 
 164 
LEMMA 3.2.   Assume αβ ~* γδ as in Eq. 3.2, with π as specified there.  Then Vπ(α) − 165 
Vπ(β) = Vπ(γ) − Vπ(δ). 166 
 167 
PROOF.  By Eq. 2.1 both differences equal Vi(π,μ) − Vi(π,ν).  · 168 
 169 
For the measurement of continuous monotonic interval scales on interval domains all 170 
that we need to observe is equalities of differences.  For instance, if RAU holds, then 171 
we can scale U(α0) = 0, U(α1) = 1 for some arbitrary α1 ê α0, and then a number of 172 
elicitations αz+1αz ~* αzαz−1 reveals U(αz) = z for all integers z.  Such measurements 173 
result, for instance, from pairs of indifferences 174 
 αj+1 ~ μix, αj ~ νiy 175 
                                                 
2  Such subjective quantities are, for instance, subjective probabilities and (subjective) utilities in 
subjective expected utility.  For the RAU model they concern the various functions in Eq. 3.1. 
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where m such pairs of indifferences give m−1 elicitations αz+1αz ~* αzαz−1 and 176 
equalities of U differences.  In this measurement, the μ-ν difference on the ith 177 
coordinate of the partition has served as a gauge to peg out the “standard sequence” of 178 
the αj’s that is equally spaced in U units.  More refined measurements result from a 179 
number of elicitations βz+1βz ~* βzβz−1 with β0 = α0 and βm = α1, which implies that 180 
U(βz) = z/m for all integers z. 181 
 RAU is obviously violated if the aforementioned measurements run into 182 
inconsistencies.  If, for example, one partition π were to imply αβ ~* γδ, and another 183 
partition π´ were to imply α´β ~* γδ for an α´ ê α, then the implied U(α´) − U(β) = 184 
U(γ) − U(δ) = U(α) − U(β) contradicts U(α´) > U(α), and RAU is violated in a 185 
deterministic model.  A necessary condition for RAU is, consequently, that such 186 
violations be excluded.  Similarly, we should not be able to improve one of β, γ, or δ 187 
above without breaking the relationship.  As we will see, it suffices to exclude such 188 
inconsistencies for the special case of Eq. 3.2 with β = γ (endogenous midpoint 189 
observations).  Indeed, the sequence αz+1αz ~* αzαz−1 above concerned this special 190 
case. 191 
 192 
DEFINITION 3.3.  Under the assumptions of Section 2, RAU-tradeoff consistency holds 193 
if strictly improving an outcome in any αβ ~* βγ breaks that relationship.  · 194 
 195 
 Tradeoff consistency implies that standard sequences such as the αj and βj above 196 
will be consistent across different partitions π.  It is similar to the standard sequence 197 
invariance condition of Krantz et al. (1971, §6.11.2). 198 
 199 
THEOREM 3.4.  RAU holds if and only if RAU-tradeoff consistency holds.  · 200 
 201 
 The same result holds if we have additive representations as in Eq. 2.1 not only 202 
on rank-ordered sets but on full product sets.  This follows as a corollary of Theorem 203 
3.4, because full product sets are unions of rank-ordered sets. 204 
                                                 
3 The notation ~*, with its “forgetting” of π, have then served to falsify RAU, but cannot be used to 
measure utility differences as in Lemma 3.2. 
 9
 205 
COROLLARY 3.5.  If the domain of preference consists of C and all tuples of the form 206 
x = (π,x1,…,xn(π)) without the restriction that x1 í ... í xn(π), then still RAU holds if 207 
and only if RAU-tradeoff consistency holds.  · 208 
 209 
 Further generalizations can be obtained.  The set providing certainty equivalents 210 
need not be the same as the set of outcomes for gambles, and the outcome sets of 211 
gambles can depend on the partitions and events.  Also more general domains can be 212 
considered.  The main requirement is that these domains provide sufficient local 213 
richness to construct preference-neighborhoods of outcomes as in the proof below, 214 
where we can use the midpoint measurement of Eq. 3.2.  Corollary 4.1 gives details. 215 
 216 
4. Proof of Theorem 3.4 217 
We demonstrated in the main text that RAU-tradeoff consistency is a necessary 218 
condition for the RAU model.  We, henceforth, assume the condition and demonstrate 219 
that the RAU model is implied.  Because the Vπ’s are interval scales, it will suffice to 220 
reduce the Lπ functions to strictly increasing affine functions. 221 
 For every partition π, define Cπ as the set of outcomes {α∈C: there exists a π-222 
related x with x ~ α}.  In other words, Cπ is the domain of Vπ (in its extended sense) 223 
intersected with C.  Because the ranges of all functions are intervals, Cπ is a 224 
preference interval in the sense that if it contains two outcomes, then it contains all 225 
outcomes in between.  α0 is contained in each Cπ.  For every partition, we can choose 226 
the levels of the representations such that Vπ(α0) = 0 because the representations in 227 
Eq. 2.1 are joint interval scales, and so we do. 228 
 Take any fixed partition πf.  For each α ∈ Cπf, define U(α) = Vπf(α).  Consider an 229 
arbitrary other partition π.  Because Cπ and Cπf both contain α0, both contain a strictly 230 
preferred outcome, and both are preference intervals, there is an outcome απ  ê α0 231 
contained in both sets.  Because Vπ is an interval scale, we can choose its scale such 232 
that Vπ(απ) = Vπf(απ) and so we do for each partition π. 233 
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 We now compare two partitions π and π´.  For each outcome λ in Cπ ∩Cπ´ that is 234 
neither minimal nor maximal in this set, we can find σ ê λ ê τ so close to λ, and an i, 235 
such that, for all outcomes α, β between σ and τ, we can have  236 
 α ~ μix,  β ~ μiy,  237 
 β ~ νix,  238 
for properly chosen π-related prospects, where also νiy is π-related. (4.1) 239 
For the certainty equivalent γ of the latter prospect νiy (irrespective of whether γ is 240 
between σ and τ or not; we will only use the case where it is between), we have αβ ~* 241 
βγ and, by Lemma 3.2, β is the Vπ midpoint between α and γ.  In this manner, for all 242 
α, β, γ between σ and τ such that β is the Vπ midpoint of α and γ, we can construct 243 
the configuration of Eq. 3.2 with β for γ and γ for δ. 244 
 Imagine that we similarly have Eq. 4.1 satisfied for π´ with respect to the same 245 
outcome λ.  That is, we have σ´ ê λ ê τ´ so close to λ, and a j, such that for all 246 
outcomes α, β between σ´ and τ´, we can have  247 
 α ~ μjx´,  β ~ μjy´,  248 
 β ~ νjx´,  249 
for properly chosen π´-related prospects, where also νiy´ is π´-related.  For the 250 
certainty equivalent γ of the latter prospect νiy´ we have αβ ~* βγ and β is the Vπ´ 251 
midpoint between α and γ.  In this manner, surely for all α, β, γ between σ´ and τ´ 252 
such that β is the Vπ´ midpoint of α and γ, we can construct the configuration of Eq. 253 
3.2 with γ = β and δ = γ.   254 
 Instead of σ and σ´ we can take their minimum, and instead of τ and τ´ we can 255 
take their maximum.  That is, we can take σ = σ´ and τ = τ´.  Then, by RAU tradeoff 256 
consistency, for all α, β, and γ between σ and τ, if β is a Vπ-midpoint of α and γ, it 257 
must also be a Vπ´ midpoint.  (Sets of midpoints are, obviously, ~ equivalence 258 
classes.) 259 
 Vπ and Vπ´ are interval scales such that for each nonmaximal and nonminimal 260 
element in their common domain there is an open preference-neighborhood within 261 
which they have the same midpoints.  It implies that the strictly increasing 262 
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transformation that relates Vπ and Vπ´ on their common domain must have second 263 
derivative 0, so that it must be affine, which by continuity extends to the maximal and 264 
minimal outcomes in their common domain.  Because Vπ and Vπ´ coincide with Vf at 265 
α0 and at points strictly preferred to but close to α0, they agree with each other at two 266 
or more points, so that they must be identical on their common domain.  In this 267 
manner, all functions Vπ coincide on their common domains, and they can be written 268 
as one function U.  This function obviously represents preference on C and, hence, on 269 
X.  The following corollary summarizes what was needed in the proof.  In the 270 
definition of a rank-ordered set we used that the set of certainty equivalents and the 271 
sets of event-contingent outcomes are all the same.  Ways to relax this point are also 272 
given in the corollary. 273 
 274 
COROLLARY 4.1.  The set of certainty equivalents and the domains of the functions 275 
Vj(π,.) can all be different, and more general domains than rank-ordered sets can be 276 
considered.  All that is needed is that all ranges of functions are intervals so that all 277 
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